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JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has

jurisdiction in this matter

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1989) and 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii)
(Supp. 1990).
ISSUE ON APPEAL
Did the Utah Tax Commission properly determine the fair market
value of Questar's operating property for 1988 in light of the
stipulated facts, the testimony of the witnesses at the hearing
held by the Tax Commission, and applicable law?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard for review of the Tax Commission's decision is
set forth in Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-16(4), which provides in pertinent part:
(4) The Appellate Court shall grant relief only if, on
the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a
person seeking judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following:
(g) The agency action is based on a
determination of fact made or implied by the
agency, that is not supported by substantial
evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court;
(h) The agency action is:
(i) an abuse of discretion delegated to
the agency by statute;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior
practice, unless the agency justifies
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons
that demonstrate a fair and rational
basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Article XIII, § 2 of the Utah Constitution:
All tangible property in the state, not
exempt under the laws of the United States, or
under this Constitution, shall be taxed at a
uniform and equal rate in proportion to its
value, to ascertained as provided by law.
Utah Code Ann- § 59-2-103(1):
(1) All tangible taxable property shall be
assessed and taxed at a uniform and equal rate
on the basis of its fair market value, as
valued on January 1•
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-201(1)(a)(b):
(1) By May 1 the following property shall be
assessed by the commission at 100% of fair
market value, as valued on January 1, in
accordance with this chapter:
(a) all property which operates as
a unit across county lines, if the
values must be apportioned among
more than one county or state;
(b)
all property
utilities . . .

of

public

Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(6):
(6) "Fair market value" means the amount of
which property would change hands between a
willing buyer and a willing seller, neither
being under any compulsion to buy or sell and
both having reasonable knowledge of the
relevant facts.

The

standard

Administrative

for

review

is

Procedures

set

Act,
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case
This is a property tax valuation appeal.

Questar Pipeline

Company ("Questar") has appealed the FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND FINAL DECISION of the Utah State Tax
Commission ("Commission") dated December 3, 1990, (Appeal No. 881456), wherein the Commission found the fair market value of
Questar's operating property for 1988 to be $296 million.
9.)

(R.

In determining fair market value, the Commission found tne

market and income approaches to value to be more reflective of
actual market conditions than the cost approach to value,
9.)

(R.

Accordingly the Commission found the cost approach to be

least reliable and the income approach to be most reliable.

The

stock and debt approach tested the reliability of the other two
approaches.

II.

(R. 9.)

Course of the Proceedings
On April 29, 1988, the Property Tax Division of the Tax

Commission1 issued to Questar its 1988 property tax assessment

1

The Property Tax Division is one of several divisions within
the Tax Commission. It is responsible for, among other things, the
valuation of public utilities for ad valorem purposes. (See Utah
Code Ann. § 59-2-201(1)).
When a centrally assessed taxpayer appeals from a valuation,
the matter is set for formal adjudication before the Commission.
At formal hearing, the
Commission's function is to weigh the
evidence presented by the taxpayer and the Property Tax Division in
determining the fair market value of the taxpayer's property.

3

of Questar's property, determining its fair market value to be
$300,000,000.

Subsequently, on May 31, 1988, Questar filed a

petition for redetermination and hearing.

(R. 398.)

Prior to

the hearing for redetermination, Questar and the Property Tax
Division stipulated to values for each of the three appraisal
approaches to value utilized to determine the fair market value
of Questar's operating property.

The only issue for resolution

at the hearing was how these three approaches should be
correlated to arrive at a final fair market value for Questar's
property.
On March 26, 1990, a hearing was held before the Commission
at which Questar and the Property Tax Division presented expert
witnesses who testified regarding the most reliable way to
correlate the three valuation approaches to arrive at a final
market value.

(R. 16.)

Questar argued that the cost approach, a

method which attempts to estimate the value of property based on
original cost with an adjustment for depreciation, was the most
reliable method for determining fair market value.

However, the

Property Tax Division presented evidence showing the fair market
value of Questar's property is more accurately measured by the
income method and the stock and debt method since both of these
methods are market-based.

Ill. Decision of the Tax Commission
On December 3, 1990, the Tax Commission issued its final
4

decision.

(R. 11.)

Based upon the evidence before it, the Tax

Commission found "that the cost approach is the least reliable
[indicator of value] and the income approach is the most
reliable.

The stock and debt approach tests the reliability of

the other two approaches."

(R. 9.)

Consistent with those

findings, and within the range of values presented to the
Commission at the hearing, the Tax Commission determined that the
fair market value of Questar's property for 1988 was $296
million.

(R. 9.)

Subsequently, Questar sought this Court's

review of that decision pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ G3-46b-16
and 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii)(Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Questar is a Utah corporation engaged in the interstate
transportation, sale, and storage of natural gas in Utah,
Wyoming, and Colorado,

(R. 6-)

Questar's operations are subject

to regulation by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

(R.

29.) When the assessment was made, Questar was a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Entrada Industries, which was a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Questar Corporation.

(R. 21.)

Questar's plant and

equipment represented approximately 29% of Questar Corporation's
total assets, its revenues accounted for approximately 33% of the
parent corporation's gross revenues, and its payroll was
approximately 20%. Questar Corporation's other activities
include gas distribution (Mountain Fuel), oil production, brick
manufacturing, and telecommunication services.
5

(R. 28.)

On or about April 7, 1988, the Property Tax Division
submitted to Questar a preliminary assessment2 which valued
Questar's property at $300 million for the 1988 tax year.

After

reviewing the initial assessment with Questar, the Property Tax
Division submitted a final property assessment of $300 million.
This assessment was made by one of the Division's appraisers, Mr.
Eckhardt Prawitt.

Mr, Prawitt valued Questar's operating

property using traditional valuation techniques.

These

techniques required the appraiser to consider the three
approaches to value, namely, cost, income and market.
Questar paid the assessment under protest and petitioned for
a hearing and redetermination of its assessment on May 31, 1988.
(R. 398-401-)

On May 11, 1989, the Property Tax Division,

seeking to settle the dispute between itself and Questar,
reevaluated its prior assessment and adjusted its valuation
downward to $292,000,000.

(R. 184.)

Prior to the hearing, Questar and the Property Tax Division
stipulated to final values of each of the three approaches to
value.

(R. 380.)

The parties further stipulated that they would

not challenge the underlying calculations of each method, rather
just the "correlationf: of these values or "weight" to be assigned

2

It has been the Property Tax Division's practice to
Questar with a preliminary property tax assessment prior to
its official assessment. This allows Questar to review the
and to discuss the assessment with the Division prior
official assessment. (R. 31.)

6

provide
issuing
figures
to the

to each approach to arrive at a final market value for Questar's
property.

(R. 380.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Commission contends that Questar's operating property
for 1988 is was $296 million.

Its findings are supported by

substantial, competent evidence.

The Commission urges this Court

to affirm its determination.
Considerable evidence was presented at the formal hearing
supporting the Commission's finding that the income and stock and
debt approaches to value were superior approaches to value than
the cost approach.

Dr. Hanke, Professor of Applied Economics at

John Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland, and Michael
Goodwin, an expert appraiser with seventeen years experience
joined with the Property Tax appraiser Mr. Echardt Prawitt in
testifying that the stock and debt and income approaches to value
are market-oriented and deserving of greater weight than the cost
approach.

These witnesses all testified that the cost approach

had little relevance to fair market value in this case.
Questar's expert witness, Professor Hal Keaton, analyzed the
stipulated values to the three approaches through a mathematical
formula that measured the standard deviation between the three
approaches.

This analysis did not appear related to a fair

market value determination.

Moreover, Professor Heaton

admittedly, did not consider his analysis to be an appraisal, but
simply a statistical relationship of the three approaches.
7

Furthermore, the actions of the Commission were not
arbitrary and capricious. After weighing the evidence in light
of the values of the three approaches stipulated to by Questar
and the Property Tax Division, the Commission adopted a value
within a range of values recommended by the Property Tax Division
appraiser, and determined the fair market value of Questar's
operating property to be $296 million.

8

ARGUMENT
I.
INTRODUCTION
The ultimate issue before this court is whether the
Commission's determination of the fair market value of Questar's
operating property for 1988 is supported by substantial evidence.
After considering the evidence at hearing including testimony by
several expert witnesses, the Commission determined the fair
market value to be $296 million,

Questar contends that it should

be $231 million.
In reaching its conclusion of value, the Commission
considered the three traditional approach to value, namely, the
cost approach, the income approach, and market approach.

The

value of each of the three approaches was stipulated to by
Questar and the Property Tax Division.

The task of the

Commission was to weigh the merits of each approach and reconcile
or correlate the three approaches to value into one opinion of
fair market value.
II.
THE COMMISSION'S DECISION IS SUPPORTED
BY SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE.
Although a ruling by the Commission on the fair market value
of Petitioner's property resolves a question of law, the
determination of fair market value itself is a factual question.
Because it is a factual determination, the proceedings below and
9

the findings of the Commission are subject to review by this
Court under the "substantial evidence" test.

This test, as

articulated in Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g), provides that
relief shall be granted only if a person seeking judicial review
has been substantially injured by agency action that is not
supported by "substantial evidence."
In appellate review, "substantial evidence" is that quantum
and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a
reasonable mind to support a conclusion.

First Nat'l Bank of

Boston v. County Bd. of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 799
P.2d 1163 (Utah 1990).

Substantial evidence is "more than a mere

'scintilla' of evidence . . . though 'something less than the
weight of the evidence'".

(Citations omitted).

Grace Drilling

v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah App. 1989).
The "substantial evidence" test requires review of the whole
record, including evidence that both supports the agency factual
findings and evidence that fairly detracts from the weight of the
evidence.

Id., at 68.

In applying the substantial evidence test, this Court is to
take cognizance of the expertise of the agency and its particular
field and give some deference to its determination.
Bank, supra.

First Nat'l

Moreover, the party challenging the agency's action

must "marshall all of the evidence supporting the findings and
show that despite the supporting facts and in light of the
conflicting contradictory evidence, the findings are not
10

supported by substantial evidence."

Grace Drilling, supra.

The focus of Questar's challenge in this matter is the Tax
Commission findings in paragraphs 8 and 9 of its final decision.
(R. 9.)

Specifically, Questar takes exception to the

Commission's finding that (1) the market and income approaches to
value were more reflective of market value than the cost approach
to value, and (2) that the fair market value of Petitioner's
operating property for 1988, was $296 million.

These findings,

however, are clearly supported by the evidence after reviewing
the record
A.

as a

whole.

THE MARKET AND INCOME APPROACHES TO VALUE ARE MORE
REFLECTIVE OF ACTUAL MARKET CONDITIONS THAN IS THE COST
APPROACH TO VALUE.
Traditional appraisal recognizes three approaches to value,

namely, cost, income and market.
based on differing rationale.

Each of these approaches is

Since public utilities rarely

sell, the approaches act as surrogates for determining fair
market value.

At the hearing below, the parties stipulated to

the values indicated by each approach.

These stipulated values

are set forth below in Table 1.

TABLE 1
Stipulated Values
($ in millions)
Cost Approach
Income Approach
Market Approach
(Stock and Debt)

$210
$303
$312

11

This appeal, in large part, debates the merits these three
value indicators and their accuracy in forecasting fair market
value.
Unlike most valuation appeals before the Commission, which
debate the values indicated by the three approaches, this appeal
questions only the theoretical application of the value
approaches.
dispute.

The values indicated by each approach are not in

(R. 380-381.)

The parties assumed that the three value

indicators were unbiased and did not have a tendency to
undervalue or overvalue Questar's property.
A. (By Professor Heaton) The issues, as I understand
it, is the appropriate selection of weights for the
three value indicators and the binding constraint in my
view is that I was told to assume that each of the
three indicators of value were unbiased, statistically
unbiased; that is, there was not a tendency to
undervalue or overvalue the properties.
(R. 62, emphasis added.)
The relevance of the three approaches to value can be best
understood by considering the definition of fair market value.
Fair market value is defined by statute to mean the amount at
which property would change hands between a willing buyer and a
willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell
and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts. . . .
(Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(6)).

This definition suggests that a

consensus of willing buyers and sellers would present the best
indication of value.

Since fair market value is set by market

participants or investors, (i.e. willing buyer and willing
12

seller) logic suggests the best approach to determine value would
be to analyze what these market participants are doing.
The cost approach to value looks at what it would cost for a
willing buyer to reconstruct the subject property.

Analysis of

this approach requires consideration of economic and functional
obsolescence.

See Pacific Power and Light Co, v. Department of

Revenue, 775 P.2d 303 (Or, 1989)
The income approach analyzes the income stream that will be
generated by the property.

The value of property results from

the use to which it is put and varies with the profitableness of
that use, present and prospective, actual and anticipate.
Cleveland et al Ry, Co. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 439 (1894).

In other

words, the value of property is the present worth of future
benefits (income stream) generated by that property.

(R. 166.)

The stock and debt approach is a surrogate for the market or
sales comparison approach.

It measures the value of property by

valuing the underlying stock and debt of a corporation.

The sum

of the value of the stock and debt represents the value of the
corporate assets under the concept that assets equal liabilities
plus owner's equity.

Since these securities are ofttimes traded

in the market, their values can readily be ascertained.
Dr. Steve Hanke, professor of applied economics at John
Hopkin's University in Baltimore, Maryland, testified for the
Property Tax Division with respect to the relevance and
application of this latter approach:
13

Q. (By Mr. [Dever]) Dr. Hanke, there has
been some discussion of the three basic
appraisal methods so far today. I think we
all understand what the three of them are.
My basic question is to you. Do you have an
opinion that one of the methods is superior
to the other two?
A. Yes I do.
Q.

Which one is that?

A. I think the stock and debt approach is
the superior approach, giving the objective
of attempting to determine the fair market
value, because it is a market based indicator
whereas the other two are not.
Q. Does it have certain aspects of it that
you consider to make it superior other than
just those?
A. Well, the primary aspect that makes it
superior is that it provides an anchor when
valuing property as to its fair market value
that's determined by a consensus of people
who are actually putting their own wealth at
risk in the market place, buyers and sellers
who are actively engaged in the market. . . .
(R. 122. emphasis added.)
Although Dr. Hanke preferred the stock and debt approach, he
testified that the next best indicator was the income approach.
A. (By Dr. Hanke) . . . I think the stock
and debt is the only valuation method that
reflects values that are primarily at their
source derived from a consensus of market
participants and that the other approaches
are inferior, with one that is totally
unacceptable in principle, being the cost
approach. It has nothing to do with what
people would pay for an asset and should
never be used.
The income approach in some case can be

14

used when the stock and debt approach is not
appropriate. The most extreme case obviously
would be if you had a privately held company
where no shares were traded, no debt was
traded or anything like that. Obviously you
would have to go to a fall back position, and
instead of relying on a consensus of market
participants who generate a market price as
your core base value, you then would have to
go to the subjective evaluation of a single
or a group of analysts or appraisers.
(R. 135.)
In Dr. Hanke's opinion, cost was accorded little or no
weight.
A. (By Dr. Hanke) . . . The cost may or -may
not have some coincidence with market value,
but there is no causal link between cost and
market value.
(R. 126.)
Michael Goodwin, an independent fee appraiser of seventeen
years with several appraisal designations, also testified for the
Property Division and ranked the stock and debt and income
approaches as superior to the cost approach.3
3

Mr. Goodwin testified at the hearing not only as an expert
appraiser, but also as an investor, who at one time had attempted
to purchase a pipeline.
Q.
(By Mr. Sackett)
I would assume, Mr.
Goodwin, that you have never been seriously in
the market to buy a pipeline; is that correct?
A.
(By Mr. Goodwin)
that's not correct.

As a matter of fact,

Q. You're fixing to buy a pipeline someplace?
A. As a matter of fact I came very close to
purchasing a pipeline.
15

Q. In general, then could you talk about the
weight you think should be applied to various
indicators of value as applied to this
particular case?
A. In this particular circumstance, if I
could speak of them in some kind of rank, I
would generally look at—and this depends on
the type of company—but in this particular
case I would generally look at that the stock
and debt indicator and the income approach
more or less equivalently, balancing between
the two, generally speaking, relegating the
cost indicator typically to a lower level of
significance. My personal opinion in this
particular case and in similar cases like
this is that the cost indicator is not a very
refined indicator of value and it does not
have a great deal of reliability in
indicating market value.
The other two indicators I think would
be preferable and would certainly by far
deserve greater emphasis in a correlation
process.
(R. 210.)
Mr. Goodwin's reasoning was based on how closely the results
mirrored the market.
A. . . . I think the chief reason that one
would want to put a significant amount of
emphasis on the stock and debt indicator is
that it does come directly from market
prices; and, secondly, it does not cause the
analyst to interject his opinion's per se
into that process.
Q.

A pipeline regulated by the FERC?

A. Yes sir. And the Kansas Corp. Commission
in the State of Kansas. A gas pipeline, I
might add.
(R. 235.)

16

(R. 211.)
Like Dr. Hanke, Mr. Goodwin testified that cost has little
relevance.
A. . . . There are few investors, in my
opinion, in this particular kind of
marketplace who place a great deal of
credence in the historical cost figures, when
their primary emphasis in my opinion is the
expected cash flow stream which they might
achieve by purchasing the assets in the first
place.
(R. 212.)
The appraiser for the Property Division, Mr.'Eckhardt
Prawitt, further pointed out why the income and stock and debt
approaches are superior indicators of value.
A. . . . Regarding the [income indicator] we
consider this the best of the three
indicators. When valuing income producing
property, because of the financial principle
that the value of the property is its sum of
the future income stream discounted to
present value. The Division primarily uses
the direct capitalization method which
eliminates the need to rely on subjective
estimates with regard to the shape and
duration of the income streams.
(R. 166.)
A. . . . With respect to the stock and debt
indicator this is the only indicator of the
three that derives its value from direct
market evidence; namely, the actual trading
of the company's securities. In the case of
the pure utility whose securities are
publicly traded, this would be the most
objective of the three indicators of value.
And in my opinion I would place at least as
much weight on it as I would the [income
indicator] of value.
17

(R. 167.)
Mr. Prawitt also pointed out the flaw in relying on the cost
approach:
Q. Now, do you believe that there's
something unique about Questar as opposed to
other companies that would cause you to give
great weight to a particular indicator or to
indicators as opposed to treating the
indicators equally.
A. Yes. The cost approach. In the cost
approach, Questar is not a new pipeline. I
don't know its exact age, but I believe its
composite age is around fifteen years. So I
wouldn't put very much faith in the cost*
indicator regardless of the fact that it is
regulated.
(R. 168.)
Questar's expert witness, Hal Heaton, took an entirely
different focus in his analysis, a focus which did not appear to
the Commission to be market oriented.
HEARING OFFICER: Why is that a mere accurate
representation of fair market value?
WITNESS: (Hal Heaton) You had three
indicators with three different numbers.
Which of these is the best? And I am going
to place weights on those based on my
judgment of the quality, and the way I
measure quality is with the standard
deviations.
HEARING OFFICER:
WITNESS:

Quality of what?

Of the estimate.

HEARING OFFICER: And to you that is sheerly
a mathematical calculation; that you measure
quality strictly by making a mathematical
calculation?

18

WITNESS: Well, I tried to measure it
mathematically. I mean, if I'm going to
place a number on it, I have to some how take
this judgment and convert it into a number.
Yes. I tried to convert it into a number,
because ultimately that's what you have to
do. You have to assess tax based on a
number. So whatever the judgment and the
concept is, you eventually have to cram that
into a number. So, yes.
(R. 107.)
Rather than measure the quality of each value approach to
value by its relationship to fair market value, Professor Heaton
simply measured the standard deviation between the three value
approaches.

His analysis was based on a statistical comparison

of the three (3) stipulated value approaches.

There was no

relationship to fair market value.
Questar has argued to this Court that reliance on the stock
and debt approach is contrary to the Commission's policy
articulated in Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. Property Tax Div. of
the Utah State Tax Comm'n, Appeals No. 85-0074 and 86-0255. On
page 5 of its decision (R. 10), the Commission refuted Questar's
argument and distinguished the facts of the Questar case from the
Northwest Pipeline decision.
That case does not change the result here. The
parent company in Northwest Pipeline was a nonpublic
corporation, whereas here, Questar Corp. is publicly
traded. There is also some indication that
Petitioner's portion of the total business of its
parent corporation is a larger portion than that which
was present in Northwest Pipeline. The difficulties
present in that case, which rendered the stock and debt
approach inappropriate, are not present here.
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(R. 10-11).
To better understand the fallacy of Questar's argument,
consider the decision of the Commission in Northwest Pipeline:
The stock and debt indicator of value is
difficult to apply to the Petitioner.
Petitioner is a wholly owned subsidiary of
the Williams Company, a privately owned, nonpublic corporation. The parent corporation
raises capital by the issuance of its own
debt and that capital is then utilized in the
business operations of the Williams Company
and its several subsidiaries including
Petitioner. Therefore, it is very difficult
to determine what portion of the stock and
debt of the Williams Company should be
allocated to Petitioner. Further, there is
no specific information available concerning
the market value of the nonpublic stock.
Because of the difficulties associated with
accurately allocating a portion of the equity
value of the parent companies nonpublicly
traded stock to Petitioner, two tiers down,
we find that the stock and debt indicator is
the least reliable of the three traditional
indicators and wil] be given little, if any
weight.
(R. 10.)
The rationale of the Northwest Pipeline decision is premised
on the belief that the parent company to Northwest Pipeline, the
Williams Companies, Inc. was a privately owned, nonpublic
corporation that raised capital by issuance of its own debt and
passed it along to its several subsidiaries.

This made it

difficult to determine what portion of stock and debt of the
Williams Companies, Inc. should be allocated to the Northwest
Pipeline.
In this case however, the parent corporation to Questar
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Pipeline is Questar Corporation.
publicly traded corporation.
Pipeline has its own debt.

Questar Corporation is a

Moreover, its subsidiary, Questar
(R. 224.) The rationale underlying

the Northwest Pipeline decision is simply not present in this
case.
During direct examination Dr. Hanke touched on this question
of valuing a subsidiary of a publicly held corporation. His
comments are insightful:
Q. Dr. Hanke, there has been some testimony
that Questar Pipeline we know has not traded
per se. Its part of the large conglomerate
of Questar Corporation is valuing this
Questar Pipeline, which is part of this in
effect reliability approach that we are using
here just simply because it has not been
actually traded itself?
A. If you go back to page 9 on the exhibit,
the firm, the entire firm, not holding the
pipeline distribution company, the [brick
making] operation and so forth and so on is
valued objectively and correctly at the unit
level, the firm level and that information
then, following the flow chart from the top
right hand corner all the way around, bingo,
you get appraisers' opinions.
And what goes in there in the matter of
Questar is it is the stock and debt fair
market valuation or should go in there in my
opinion, the fair market value based on the
stock and debt evaluation of the unit—or,
the firm.
Now, the appraiser has to come in and
make some judgment calls, and the judgment
call, the critical one in this case, is
getting down to the pipeline level from the
unit itself, the total unit.
My argument is that this is the
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appropriate place to make the judgment,
because you started with the right anchor,
you have the right market valuation for the
total unit, and you then make the judgments
based on [the] fair market value of the total
unit. And, of course, you are going to have
to do a unit valuation with other techniques
that are used, anyway, and make allocations
on down the line.
My argument is that the other methods
for determining the unit values are not
appropriate. There are subjective
evaluations or personal opinions of personal
individuals or firms doing the valuations.
They are not the opinions expressed by the
market participants that are objective.
Market prices are objective, and the unit
value is objective.
(R. 135-136.)
Because the parent company, Questar Corporation, is public
traded, valuing the company at the parent level starts the
process from an objective market-based viewpoint.

Allocating

from that viewpoint is no more subjective than the assumptions
made in either the income or cost approaches.
Mike Goodwin further testified that even the allocation
process was reasonably objective since Questar Pipeline had its
own long term debt.

The only subjective allocation dealt with

allocating the stock.
Q. And have you heard how the State performs
its allocation?
A.

Yes.

I am aware of how they did that.

Q. In your opinion is this an acceptable
method to make an allocation?
A.

It is, particularly in light of the other
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information which is available in all of the
published financial data. One can obviously
see a range of allocation data applicable to
just Questar's common stock. But certainly
the numbers and the factors used by the state
were reasonable in my opinion.
They are also used fairly widely
throughout the country to do this type of
allocation. I myself have used this factor,
earnings and other factors to do the same
kind of calculation in a variety of
appraisals.
I might point out, if I could Mr. Dever,
we're only talking at this point about the
common stock. I don't know if it was very
clear in earlier testimony, but there
shouldn't be any dispute about the long term
debt values in this particular case, because
Questar Pipeline had its own long term debt.
If you were to look at the work papers
of the state, I think you will see that we
are talking about $100 million to $150
million of value in the stock and debt
indicator, which is not subject to any kind
of allocation. So we are really talking when
you ask me those questions, only the common
stock part of that total value. There is a
substantial amount of money that's not in
dispute in my opinion or at least it
shouldn't be. It's fairly straight forward
in value and long term debt and current
liabilities. Those are pretty simple. What
we have been talking are really the common
stock allocations. And I should point out,
any kind of variation, as Dr. Heaton referred
to, that would seem to in his view added a
degree of reliability or otherwise only
pertains to the common stock. It does not
pertain to the entire process as he has
analyzed it . . .
(R. 223-224.)
Questar is simply wrong in trying to align itself with the
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facts of the Northwest Pipeline decision.
Questar attempted to carry its argument one step further
when it filed a Supplemental Brief with this Court.

The

Supplemental Brief was filed because Questar discovered that
Williams Companies, Inc. in the Northwest Pipeline case, was
publicly traded, not privately held as believed by the
Commission.

Questar therefore reasoned that since its parent

corporation also traded publicly, it was now analogous to the
facts in Northwest Pipeline since Williams Companies, Inc. also
traded publicly.

Accordingly, Questar assumed that the rationale

of the Commission in Northwest Pipeline must also apply to
Questar thereby supporting its argument that the stock and debt
approach should be given little weight.
is flawed.

This reasoning, however,

Whether Williams Companies, Inc. was publicly or

privately traded is absolutely irrelevant to their argument.
The Northwest Pipeline decision was premised on the
assumption that Williams Companies, Inc. was a privately held
corporation.

This premise formed the basis of the Commission's

conclusion not to rely heavily on the stock and debt approach.
Although the premise may have been inaccurate, the reasoning that
followed was not.4

Moreover, to modify the underlying premise

A

During direct examination, Dr. Hanke affirmed the validity
of this reasoning. (R. 135.)
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of a ruling will in effect modify the entire ruling.5

In other

words, learning that Williams Companies, Inc. was a public rather
than a private corporation affects only the Northwest Pipeline
decision—not this decision.
Pipeline decision is sound.

The policy underlying the Northwest
Questar Corporation is a public

corporation with stocks that are traded daily on the market.

The

stock and debt approach becomes highly relevant since it is
objective and market-based.
Turning to another point, Questar has also taken exception
to the Commission's finding (R. 11, 5 9) that the cost approach
is the least reliable approach to value, the income approach is
the most reliable approach, and the stock and debt approach tests
the reliability of the income and cost approaches.

Questar

argues there was no direct testimony establishing that finding.
Whether there was or was not direct testimony to that effect,
there was evidence sufficient for this Court to infer such a
finding.
All witnesses for the Property Division testified of the
relative weakness of the cost approach and the strength of the
stock and debt and income approaches.

The Property Tax Division

appraiser, Eckhardt Prawitt, testified that in his opinion the
5

To support its contention, Questar asked this Court to take
judicial notice of the fact that Williams is publicly traded.
While the Commission does not dispute this fact, it was
inappropriate for Questar to use 1986 and 1987 data when the only
data relevant to the Northwest Pipeline decision was data from 1984
and 1985.
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income approach was the best of the three approaches.
A. . . . Regarding the [income indicator],
we consider this the best of the three
indicators. When valuing income-producing
property, because of the financial principle
that the value of the property is its sum of
the future income stream discounted to
present value. The Division primarily uses
the direct capitalization method, which
eliminates the need to rely on subjective
estimates with regard to the shape and
duration of the income streams.
The competence of this method is
dependent on the quality of the income steam
and the quality of the capitalization rate as
well as the degree of matching between the
two.
(R. 166.)
Moreover, there was significant testimony that the stock and
debt approach was market-oriented and objective, more so than
either the income or cost,

(R. 122-126.)

By inference then, the

stock and debt approach, being market-based and objective, would
be a good cross check to the other two approaches which were more
subjective in nature.
B.

THE COST APPROACH IS THE LEAST RELIABLE
INDICATOR OF VALUE.
At the hearing below, considerable testimony was directed to

the application and weaknesses of the cost approach to value.
The general consensus of all expert witnesses testifying for the
Property Tax Division was that the cost approach in this case had
little relevance to value, even though Questar was subject to
rate base regulation.
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The reasoning behind this concept was, perhaps, best
expressed by Dr. Hanke in his response to direct examination by
Mr. Dever:
Q. Now, when we talk about the cost
approach, what is your opinion of the cost
approach and how it is used?
A. Well, the cost approach tells you how
much it would cost either at cost originally
to build something or how much it would cost
to replace it; but it doesn't tell you how
much the asset would exchange for it in the
market. It has nothing—there is no causal
link between cost approach and market value.
An this is, there kind of glaring examples.
You can have a—lets say I build a house for
$100,000, and it will cost $100,000 to
replace it. It burns down, and the
neighborhood that I am in has deteriorated
over the years so that in fact the market
transactions that are occurring in the
neighborhood for identical houses are
$75,000, I'm not going to come in and insist
that the fair market value of the thing is
$100,000 when in fact there are comparable
sales going on all around the neighborhood at
$7 5,000. The cost may or may not have some
coincidence with market value, but there is
no causal link between cost and market value.
(R. 125-126, emphasis added.)

Cost is not value.

Unlike the market and income approaches,

the cost approach is not market-based.
Mr. Goodwin, both an appraiser and an investor, stated:
A. Part of the problem is that you are
dealing with really a fractional or summation
sort of approach with a cost approach. And
part of the real reason that it isn't very
applicable in these kinds of circumstances is
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that investors simply don't think that way.
There are few investors in my opinion in this
particular kind of market place who place a
great deal of credence in historical figures
when their primary emphasis in my opinion is
the expected cash flow stream which they
might achieve by purchasing the assets in the
first place.
As I said, I think earlier, Mr. [Dever],
the cost approach in my view is really a
quite unrefined kind of number in this
process for this kind of company partly
because of the imperfections in the
regulatory arena as well, but chiefly because
the investor himself does not place a lot of
credence in my opinion on such a number.
(R. 211-212. )
Professor Heaton in testifying for Questar was told to
assume that the cost approach was unbiased.

His entire analysis,

including assumptions and conclusions were based on that premise.
However, outside of the assumption that the cost approach was
unbiased, there was some testimony by Professor Heaton suggesting
that in past appraisals he had put little weight on the cost
approach.

Q. (By Mr. Dever) Now, Dr. Heaton, haven't
you previously testified in Court hearings
that you didn't put much weight in the cost
approach?
A. Two qualifications. One, I was told to
assume for purposes of this hearing that the
estimators were unbiased. My concern in the
previous cases was that the cost indicator
was a biased value. I was told to ignore
bias for this case.
Q.

So your answer is yes.
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Previously you

have testified that there is not a lot of
weight, but you don't believe that it's
applicable in this particular case?
A. Because I was told to accept the values
as unbiased indicators.
(R. 115.)
In its opening Brief, Questar has proffered the argument
that because Questar is subject to rate base regulation by FERC,
far greater weight must be placed on the cost indicator.

This

argument, however, flies in the face of contrary evidence
presented at the hearing.
During the hearing, counsel for Questar raised this argument
with several of the witnesses. While acknowledging that revenues
in some degree are constrained by the determination of the rate
base, Dr. Hanke thoroughly refuted the suggested relationship
between fair market value and rate base.
Q. So isn't it fair to say that the revenues
of the pipeline are constrained, at least to
the extent that the rate base is an element
of that equation by what the regulator
determines the rate base to be? Isn't that
right?
A. In some degree, the revenues are
constrained by the determination of the rate
base. I agree.
Q. So it's not really accurate to say is it
that the cost method to the extent that it's
very close to the determination of the rate
base is just someone's subjective judgment of
the value of the company because here we have
an example where the value directly derives a
revenue strength; isn't that correct?
A.

No, that is incorrect.
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That's where

you've made the mistake. If that was the
case, what you're jumping to, you're mixing
things up here, because you have this rate
regulation going on the one hand, but we're
trying to get fair market value on the other
hand and those are two separate things
although they might give the appearance of
being true. If they were equal to each other
the stock and debt approach would give you
whatever the rate base was. The two numbers
would be the same.
Q. Wouldn't that be true only if the entity
we're talking about had actively traded
public common shares available to the market
place.
A. Well, just for the sake of argument,
there are plenty of firms that look like that
and the rate base will be different than the
stock and debt market base valuation. Any
you go—again, using this kind of logic, you
can go to the market and look at market
prices versus book.
You know, what you're saying is that we
don't even need a market, why do we need a
market? Why do we need a stock market?
You know all you have to do is just, you
know, go to the regulators and look up what
the rate base is, and that should be what any
willing buyer and seller would be able to
transact.
Now, in the case of Questar, it's very
clear to me that if you use a cost based
approach to value the unit, everything they
do, you use the same cost base methodology,
you get a number that is lower than the stock
and debt for the total unit.
Now, if the insiders, the corporate
officers and boards of—the people on the
board of directors and so forth thought that
the cost base approach was valid as an
indicator of underlying value that something
was wrong with the market based approach,
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because it was higher, you know what they
would be doing. They would be net short in
the market for the stock.
Well, they're not net short. They are
net long. They are holders of shares on
balance. So that they have a comfort level,
obviously with a market valuation of what
they perceive personally in their own
personal subjective valuations of the
underlying value are. They think, if
anything, the market prices are lower than
their own personal subjective valuations.
But certainly not the other way.
(R. 139-142.)
Mr. Prawitt, the Property Division Appraiser, corroborated
Dr. Hanke's testimony and provided further insight into this
analysis:
A. . . . When talking earlier about the cost
approach, I mentioned a sanity test I believe
may apply at times. One of these is a
comparison of the company's shares, prices to
its book per share of value, or book value
per share commonly referred to as the market
to book ratio.
In looking at that April 8, 1933 value
line report on Questar Corporation, I
observed a market to book ratio of 1.38.
Q.

What does that mean?

A. What this means is that on the average
the market value of that portion of the
assets that the shareholder is entitled to is
worth 1.38 times the value of the net book
value of those same assets. However, I
should say that the report prior to—the
value lines report in December or January,
the book—price to book ratio is only 1:28
and I think for the history, after
eliminating some outliers and what not, I
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think it settles down to somewhere in the
neighborhood of 1.3 I would guess.
(R. 169.)
In spite of this testimony, Questar contends that because a
willing buyer would indeed be cognizant of the company's
regulation, such a fact must therefore significantly affect the
selling price, biasing it towards the cost approach.

However,

Mr. Goodwin addressed this point and summed up generally the flaw
behind Questar's reasoning:
Q. You indicated fairly early in your
testimony that the investor was generally
cognizant of the utility rate base or
regulatory rate base. Isn't that correct?
A. The investor would be cognizant of that
process and would be aware generally of the
net book figures, I think, at any one point
in time.
Q. You don't disagree with the previous
characterizations that the revenue stream of
the pipeline is determined by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission's rate making
process, do you?
A. I'm not sure exactly what characterization you referred to at this point. I do
disagree that the revenue stream generated by
this kind of tax payer and this one in
particular in necessarily defined with any
degree of certainty by that process over
time. That is not the case.
There are market imperfections, not the
least of which are differences of opinion
between investors as to the rigidness or
laxity by which this company and other
companies like it are regulated. If it were
a perfect world, there may be some one to one
relationship, but that's far from the case
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Mr. Sackett.
Q. Did you not say that investors or—yes
investors would look at the expected cash
flow stream of a perspective company?
A.

Absolutely.

Q. And you disagreed with the proposition
that cash flow stream of Questar Pipeline is
explicitly determined by its regulatory
overseer, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission in the establishment of its rates
and charges?
A. I disagree to the point that—shall I
finish?
Q. Yes.
A. I disagree to the extent that I just
indicated. And if I could perhaps try it
again. The way you frame the question, it
sounds as though when the regulator gets done
and sort of turns the key and the lights go
off at night, everybody in the world knows
what Questar is going to make next year.
That is not the case. There are
imperfections in that regulatory process
which do not necessarily with any degree of
certainty let us say for sure what those cash
flows will be in the future in the next
number of years. And secondly, and probably
more importantly, the investor has his own
view of the regulatory process and whether
that arena is a good arena or a bad arena,
lets say, in the sense of generating cash
flows, it doesn't make much difference
whether you and I Mr. Sackett believe that
the regulator does his job well or not.
Its the guy who puts the money on the
line and buys stock in Questar Corp. who
finally says: "Yes, as a matter of fact I'll
pay 28 percent more than book value for this
company because I think the regulatory arena
has in fact been official perhaps to this
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company.
And that is the case in this particular
instance. We have about 1.3 market to book
ratio based on the calculations I made.
(R. 229-231.)
In further support of its cost/rate base argument, Questar
cites Boston Edison Company v. Board of Assessors, 439 N.E. 2d
763 (Mass. 1982).
this case.

However, Boston Edison is distinguishable from

Its facts are substantially different.

The

methodology competing with the cost/rate base method in Boston
Edison was different from the methods in this case.

The Boston

Edison Court never considered an income or stock and debt
approach to value.

Moreover, unlike Boston Edison, there was

substantial evidence in the record to support the Commission's
decision to place greater reliance on the income and stock and
debt approaches than on the cost approach.

Not only did Questar

agree that the values indicated by the income and stock and debt
approaches were in excess of the cost approach, but the testimony
of Dr. Hanke, Mr. Goodwin, and Mr. Prawitt provided adequate
evidence to adopt these approaches to the exclusion of the cost
approach.
Questar also cites Montana Power Co. v. FERC, 599 F.2d 295
(9th Cir. 1979) to point out that rate regulated facilities that
are bought by another company will not be allowed to earn on more
than the original depreciated cost base, even though a higher
price may have been paid in the market place.
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But even in

Montana Power Co, the market value exceeded the cost value. This
supports the Commission's position that market value can and does
exceed a cost/rate base valuation. As Mr. Prawitt and Mr.
Goodwin pointed out in their testimonies, the market to book
ratio often exceeds 1.1.

(R. 169. ) For Questar Corporation, the

ratio ranged from 1.28 to 1.38.
(R. 169.)
It is important to point out that Questar does not take the
view that the cost approach necessarily represents the fair
market value of its operating property.

On page 24 of its

Opening Brief, Questar states, "Questar does not take the view
that the cost/rate-base method is by itself, dispositive of the
appraisal, nor that the rate base "caps" the value that can be
used to assess property taxes."

(Emphasis original.)

Indeed, Questar cannot take such an extreme position since
its own recommended value of $231 million is in excess of the
stipulated cost approach value of $210 million.

Moreover, by its

own stipulated admission, Questar has agreed that Questar's value
as indicated by the income and stock and debt approach is in
excess of $300 million.

To argue as Questar has on pages 18 and

19 of its Opening Brief, is mere opinion of counsel and contrary
to the weight of testimony presented at hearing.

Questar's rate-

base argument is simply without merit.
Questar criticizes the Tax Commission for stating that the
cost approach is considered a reliable indicator only when
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sufficient data and conditions are not present for the other two
approaches.

Yet, that inference can clearly be drawn from the

evidence.
All of the experts acknowledged the application of the three
traditional approaches to value. Moreover, all of the expert
witnesses for the Property Division further testified that the
cost approach was least reliable because it had little or no
relationship to value.

They also testified that the stock and

debt and income approaches are better indicators of value because
they are market-oriented.

If cost then is considered an

unreliable approach to value compared to the income and stock and
debt approaches, it logically follows that the cost approach is
reliable only when there is insufficient data to support the
stock and debt or income approaches.
In summary, the evidence supports the Commission's finding
that the cost approach of value does not accurately

represent

the fair market value of Questar's operating property and should
be accorded little weight.
C.

THE CORRELATION OF VALUE APPROACHES IN THE APPRAISAL PROCESS
IS A MATTER OF JUDGMENT AND CANNOT BE REDUCED TO A
MATHEMATICAL EQUATION.
Under the "substantial evidence" test set forth in the UAPA,

the reviewing court is to look at evidence that supports the
factual findings of the agency on review, as well as evidence
that fairly detracts from the weight of the evidence.
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See Grace

Drilling, supra.

Thus far in this brief, the Commission has

presented evidence that clearly supports its findings. The
Commission views correlation as a matter of judgment for the
expert appraiser.

In contrast, Questar argues for this Court to

adopt an analysis that converts the task of appraisal into a
precise mathematical calculation devoid of market analysis.
Questar's approach to the correlation process was to analyze
statistically the three approaches to value and to measure by
mathematical formula the standard deviation between the
approaches.

The actual formula is set forth in Exhibit 5.

(R. 253-264.)

Note that the issue, as framed by Questar's

witness, is what "weighting" scheme results in the lowest
estimation error for Questar.
value of Questar's property?

It is not, what is the fair market
(R. 253.)

The strongest argument

against this type of analysis is an admission by Questar's own
expert, Professorrieaton,that his analysis was not considered an
appraisal.
HEARING OFFICER: Alright. Now, looking at
those three factors, the market method or the
stock and debt, arrives at a value of $312
million. And your opinion of value is its
$80 million to $90 million under that. Why
does your judgment—what tells you that it's
$80 to $90 million under $312 million?
WITNESS: Okay. First of all, I'm not
conducting an appraisal here. What I am
trying to do is come up with the optimal
weights. The $231 million comes out of the
optimal weights, not my appraisal.
So you are trying to read more into my
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testimony than what I was trying to give.
HEARING OFFICER:
that.

And I don't want to do

WITNESS: I was testifying on a very narrow
issue. It is not my appraisal of the value
of this company. It's my best estimate is
what it reflects, my best estimate of what
that weighting scheme ought to be, based on
the estimate;. . .
(R. 107-108, emphasis added.)
This point was reiterated again a few moments later during
the hearing in response to another question poised by the hearing
officer:
HEARING OFFICER: Well, we don't—we based it
on evidence, and that's the evidence before
us is that $210 million is the low and $312
million is the high.
Now, have you given us testimony as to
what the fair market value is someplace in
there, or have you just given us some
statistical calculations? Are you giving us
testimony as to value?
WITNESS: We are into a tight area of
semantics here. I was—I can't answer that
question simply. In my own mind I am not
giving you my appraisal. In my mind I am
giving you my best shot estimate based on the
quality of the three estimates you have. I
am telling you what weighting scheme you
ought to use. Now, if that is—if you
consider that to be an appraisal, so be it.
In my mind I don't consider it an appraisal.
(R. 109-110, emphasis added.)
The Commission argues that this admission, by itself, gives
this Court sufficient grounds to rule in favor of the Commission.
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Professor Heaton's analysis does not conform with appraisal
practice.
Furthermore, not only is his analysis not considered an
appraisal, but it did not appear to have any relationship to fair
market value.
Q. (By Mr. Dever) Professor Heaton, these
three indicators of value that you
correlated, were the indicators correlated to
each other or to themselves, rather than to
the market value of Questar Pipeline?
A.

Yes.

(R. 115.)

It should further be noted that when asked whether the
Property Tax Division was wrong in its correlation process, even
Questar's witness was unable to state with certainty that the
analysis by the Commission was not correct.
HEARING OFFICER: Well, if you don't know
what they did, then you can't testify—then
your testimony is not that it was clearly
wrong? And I don't think this goes as much
to your testimony as it does to perhaps the
burden of proof that exists between the
parties.
WITNESS: I guess—what was clearly—when you
say something was clearly wrong, what
something do you have reference to?
HEARING OFFICER: Whatever the Property Tax Division
did, are they clearly wrong?
WITNESS: If you mean were they clearly wrong in
estimating the cost indicator at 210 million, no. Are
they clearly wrong in estimating the stock market debt
indicator at 303 million? No. Were they clearly wrong
in coming up with a correlation—however they came up
with it, the answer is no. The only thing I am trying
to do is take the numbers they gave me, and using a
mathematical derivation, come up with the best
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estimator.
So the elements of what they did I'm not
saying any of that is wrong. I just take
what they gave me and work with it.
(R. 117-118, emphasis added.)
Questar also claims that the income and stock and debt
approaches are virtually identical.

Questar's argument is that

if the two indicators are the same, then the correlation process
is in reality only between two approaches to value rather than
three.

Using Professor Heaton's statistical analysis on only two

value approaches, he argues, would place even greater statistical
weight on the cost approach.
The Commission disputes the claim that these two value
approaches are one and the same.

If they were identical, they

should yield identical values; yet they do not.

The value of one

differs from the value of the other by nine (9) million dollars.
Unlike the stock and debt approach, the income approach looks to
market derived earnings/price ratios whereas the stock and debt
approach looks at the actual company specific stock and debt.
They are two different approaches.

The similarity is that they

are both market-oriented.
Even assuming, however, that they are identical, which the
Commission denies, such a fact still should not imply that cost
must be given greater weight.

Appraisal is not subject to

precise formula calculations and mathematical precision.

Rather,

it is a judgment call left for the expert appraiser to make based
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on the quality of the underlying data.
It is entirely conceivable that in any given appraisal, an
appraiser might discard all but one approach to value to arrive
at an estimate of fair market value.

For instance, an appraiser

could, if the quality of the approach warranted it, consider only
a stock and debt value to the exclusion of either cost or income
approaches.

Or, the appraiser might consider only an income

approach, or where the income and stock and debt approaches do
not apply, a cost approach.

The appraiser might also weigh all

three approaches equally, or in any other combination.
Moreover, this process may vary from year to year on the
same property.

One year, for instance, there might be a number

of sales that could be used as a comparison to the subject
property.

In another year, there may be no sales and the income

approach might yield the best estimate of value.

Moreover, it

may be that information on the income approach and the market
approach simply does not exist, such as with newer properties
recently constructed, that do not yet have histories of cash
flows or where there are no comparable sales.

In that case, the

cost approach would receive the greatest weight.

It is simply

too rigid and unrealistic to argue and conclude that the process
of appraisal must be set forth with mathematical certainty and
must be measured by the standard deviation between approaches.
Valuation is an art, not a science.
intelligent exercise of judgement.
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It boils down to an

It is always an estimate

built on a foundation of assumption.

It is an attempt to

ascertain what a public utility would sell for if it were for
sale under ideal conditions, between a willing and knowledgeable
buyer and a willing and eligible seller.

Since there are

relatively few sales of public utilities, and those few that are
made are not typical, there are no comparable sales upon which to
base value.

Instead, conclusions as to market value are based on

each appraiser's best judgment.

Each appraiser approaches the

task evaluation with his own assumptions and theories as to what
potential buyers and sellers would or should consider in arriving
at a price.

AT&T Communications of California v. State Bd. of

Equalization No. 500802. (Cal. Super. Ct., Co of Sacramento,
Dept. 24, Feb. 1, 1991)

The process of correlation and

appraising requires flexibility for the appraiser who evaluates
the underlying data for each property from year to yearQuestar has criticized the Commission for not providing a
detailed explanation of how it arrived at a fair market
determination of $296 million; yet, the Commission has clearly
shown that its determination was the product of placing great
reliance on the income and stock debt approaches and little
reliance on the cost approach.

The actual number itself was

chosen from within the range of values recommended to the
Commission during the hearing by Mr. Prawitt, the Property Tax
Division appraiser.
During the hearing, both sides suggested ranges of value for
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the Commission to consider.

Questar recommended a range between

$220 million and $231 million.

(R. 32.)

The Property Division

recommended a range between $290 million to $310 million.
(R. 188.)

The finding by the Commission of a fair market value

of $296 million fell squarely within the range of value proffered
by the Property Tax Division.

To say there was no basis for the

Commission's determination is simply to ignore the evidence.

The

Commission's finding of a fair market value is both rational and
reasonable and based on substantial competent evidence.

It

should not be reguired of the Commission to resort to placing
specific weights on each value approach.

Instead, it should be

enough to simply choose a value with the range of values
presented to the Commission by the various witnesses.

The

Commission urges this Court to affirm its finding that the fair
market value of Questar's property is $296 million.

III.
THE TAX COMMISSION DID NOT ACT IN AN ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS
MANNER IN SETTING QUESTAR'S FAIR MARKET VALUE AT $296 MILLION.
Questar argues that the Property Tax Division "has advanced
inconsistent, ever-changing positions and theories" which this
Court should somehow infuse into the final decision rendered by
the Commission, and thereby view the Commission's decision as
arbitrary and capricious and not supported by substantial
evidence.

The Tax Commission takes strong issue with this
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argument and Questar's rationale.
The authority to assess Questar's property is expressly
vested in the Commission.

Utah Const, art. XIII, § 11 mandates

that the Commission "shall assess mines and public utilities. . .
The Commission has properly delegated to the Property Tax
Division the task of arriving at a figure representing 100% of
fair market value of all Questar's property of as of January 1 of
the taxable year.

In arriving at a final figure, the Property

Tax Division may employ several methods of valuation.

In this

case, it employed three approaches to valuation in an effort to
arrive at one valuation and a fair and reasonable assessment.
This represents a proper exercise of the Commission's
administrative functions.
A taxpayer has the opportunity to petition the Commission
for a redetermination of an assessment it deems erroneous.

In

this case, during the formal hearing, Questar called expert
witnesses that put forth arguments supportive of its position.
It had full opportunity to question the Property Tax Division's
witnesses and take issue with its position.

The Commission,

functioning properly in its adjudicative capacity, was fully
apprised of all arguments and positions and supporting evidence
for each position.

Based upon this full appraisal, and after due

consideration, the Commission made its final decision.

It is the

decisicn of the Commission, not the Property Tax Division that is
subject to review by this Court.
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Questar complains of a "moving target/' alleging unfairness
because it could not determine the "weight" given to each of the
three valuation methods in arriving at a final assessment.
However, as previously argued, no "weighting" formula is
required.

The Commission's responsibility is to determine what

is the reasonable and proper value of the property•

In doing so,

it may utilize and adopt one method of valuation, to the total
exclusion of the other two, if that approach will render a proper
result.

See Utah Power & Light v. Utah State Tax Comm'n,

P.2d 590 (Utah 1979).

322

Further, the Commission's past procedure

does not mandate employment of a similar procedure in the future.
Id. at 334.

Questar and the Property Tax Division proposed three (3)
approaches to value that resulted in three different valuation
figures.

It is the Commission's adjudicative responsibility to

consider all pertinent arguments and evidence; but in the
exercise of its expertise, it must determine the final valuation
based on reasoned consideration of all the evidence.
Questar claims the Commission acted in an arbitrary and
capricious manner in setting the valuation at $296 million.
the reasons previously cited, this claim is without merit.

For
The

Commission properly considered all evidence and gave all due
thought and consideration to Questar's arguments and experts'
opinions.

The findings are supported by substantial evidence and
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support the final decision.

The Commission's findings of fact

are "accorded substantial deference and will not be overturned if
based on substantial evidence, even if another conclusion from
the evidence is permissible."

Hurley v. Board of Review of

Indus, Comm'n, 767 P.2d 524, 526-527 (Utah 1988).
In Vali Convalescent & Care Inst, v. Division of Health Care
Fin., 797 P.2d 438 (Utah App. 1990) the court of appeals provided
a general overview of applicable standards of review of an
administrative decision.

The court stated that when reviewing an

agency's findings of fact, courts traditionally accord
considerable leeway to those findings and disturb them only if
they are "arbitrary and capricious". Jji. at 433 (quoting USX v.
Industrial Comm'n, 781 P.2d 883, 886 (Utah App. 1989)).

Further,

"findings are arbitrary and capricious when there is no evidence
of any substance to support them." Ld. 797 P.2d 443.
The Commission urges this Court to adopt a standard similar
to that enunciated by Court of Appeals of Washington.

Under this

"arbitrary and capricious standard", a petitioner must show that
the administrative agency's action was willful and unreasoning,
and made without consideration and in disregard of facts and
circumstances.

Wallace v. Employment Sec. Dep't., 51 Wash.App.

787, 755 P.2d 815, 819 (1988).

See also Kerr-Belmark Const. Co.

v. City Council, 36 Wash.App. 370, 674 P.2d 684, 687 (1984) where
the court defined arbitrary and capricious as:
[W]illful and unreasoning action, taken
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without regard to a consideration of the
facts and circumstances surrounding the
action. Where there is room for two
opinions, an action taken after due
consideration is not arbitrary and capricious
even though a reviewing court may believe it
to be erroneous•
The findings and conclusions of the Commission were based
upon adequate evidence,

Questar has not marshalled sufficient

evidence to show that despite the supporting facts, the
Commission's findings are not supported by substantial evidence.
Therefore, the Commission's action cannot be characterized as
arbitrary and capricious*
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons cited herein, the Commission respectfully
urges this Court to affirm its finding that the fair market value
of Questar Pipeline Company's operating property for 1988 was
$296 million.
DATED this +-*-

day of June, 1991.
R. Paul Van Dam
Attorney General

By Kelly w. Wright
Assistant Attorney General
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